admin / Synapse-Cortex
publicSelf Hosted ITSM Tool with RBAC/Tenanting and MFA
Synapse-Cortex / Synapse-Cortexv2 / app / routers / remediation.py
26714 B · main
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 | import uuid from dataclasses import asdict from datetime import datetime, timezone from typing import Optional from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status from sqlalchemy.orm import Session from .. import models, schemas from ..ai.executor import get_live_executor, get_simulated_executor, sudo_password from ..ai.guardrails import PlanStep, graph_uses_freeform_command, resolve_placeholders, run_guardrails from ..ai.investigator import InvestigatorError, get_anthropic_client, investigate from ..ai.vault import VaultError, decrypt_secret from ..audit import log_audit from ..database import get_db from ..deps import get_session_user router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/tickets/{ticket_id}/remediation", tags=["remediation"]) # Fixed mask standing in for the real credential secret everywhere a # command is displayed or persisted (proposed plan, Actions Taken text, # execution log) - the real value is only ever substituted in-memory, # immediately before dispatch to the executor, and never stored or # returned via any API response. See app/ai/vault.py for the same # decrypt-only-immediately-before-use discipline applied to the secret # itself. MASKED_SECRET = "********" def _ticket_credential_context(ticket: models.Ticket) -> dict: """What's available to resolve {{username}}/{{ip_address}}/{{password}} placeholders for this ticket - passed to run_guardrails() so a playbook that references data the ticket doesn't have yet is blocked with a clear reason instead of sending the literal placeholder text.""" return { "has_username": bool(ticket.credential_ref and ticket.credential_ref.username), "has_ip": bool(ticket.asset and ticket.asset.ip_address), "has_password": bool(ticket.credential_ref), } def _display_steps(steps: list[PlanStep], ticket: models.Ticket) -> list[PlanStep]: """Resolves {{username}}/{{ip_address}} to their real values (safe to show or store) and {{password}} to a fixed mask - used for the proposed plan and Actions Taken text. Never used for the command actually dispatched to the executor (see _execute_plan, which does its own resolution with the real secret).""" username = ticket.credential_ref.username if ticket.credential_ref else None ip_address = ticket.asset.ip_address if ticket.asset else None password = MASKED_SECRET if ticket.credential_ref else None return [ PlanStep( node_id=s.node_id, label=s.label, command=resolve_placeholders(s.command, username=username, ip_address=ip_address, password=password), ) for s in steps ] def _get_tenant_ticket(db: Session, ticket_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> models.Ticket: ticket = ( db.query(models.Ticket) .filter(models.Ticket.id == ticket_id, models.Ticket.tenant_id == tenant_id) .first() ) if not ticket: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND) return ticket def _get_tenant_run(db: Session, run_id: uuid.UUID, ticket_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> models.RemediationRun: run = ( db.query(models.RemediationRun) .filter( models.RemediationRun.id == run_id, models.RemediationRun.ticket_id == ticket_id, models.RemediationRun.tenant_id == tenant_id, ) .first() ) if not run: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND) return run def _post_action(db: Session, *, tenant_id: uuid.UUID, ticket_id: uuid.UUID, user_id: Optional[uuid.UUID], body: str) -> None: db.add(models.TicketAction(tenant_id=tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket_id, user_id=user_id, body=body)) db.flush() def _format_plan(steps: list[PlanStep]) -> str: if not steps: return "(no commands)" return "\n".join(f"{i + 1}. {s.label or s.command}: {s.command}" for i, s in enumerate(steps)) def _format_results(execution_log: list[dict]) -> str: """Renders the per-step command output for the permanent Actions Taken log, so the full result of a run is viewable in the ticket history forever - not just in the (latest-run-only) AI panel. Commands/outputs here are already secret-scrubbed by _execute_plan.""" if not execution_log: return "(no output)" blocks = [] for step in execution_log: label = step.get("label") or step.get("node_id") or "step" blocks.append(f"[{label}] $ {step.get('command', '')} (exit {step.get('exit_status')})") output = (step.get("output") or "").strip() if output: blocks.append(output) return "\n".join(blocks) def _run_plan( db: Session, *, run: models.RemediationRun, ticket: models.Ticket, steps: list[PlanStep], user_id: Optional[uuid.UUID], live: bool, terminal: bool, ) -> None: """Decrypts the ticket's linked credential, dispatches each command through the SSH executor, and records the outcome on the run plus a permanent Actions Taken entry. Never invoked unless guardrails have already passed for these exact steps. ``live`` - when True, use the real paramiko executor (actually fixing the client over SSH), on every deployment. When False, always simulate (the Simulate/rehearsal an operator reviews before approving a live run). ``terminal`` - when True, the run reaches a terminal SUCCEEDED/FAILED state. When False (dry run) the run stays PENDING_APPROVAL so the operator can review the simulated output and then approve a real execution on the same run.""" # Live runs use the real SSH executor on every deployment; dry runs always # simulate. There is no "demo live" - the safe path is the Simulate button. executor = get_live_executor() if live else get_simulated_executor() use_live = live def _fail(message: str) -> None: run.outcome_summary = message if terminal: run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.FAILED _post_action(db, tenant_id=run.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user_id, body=message) if not ticket.credential_ref_id or not ticket.credential_ref: _fail("No credential is linked to this ticket; execution could not proceed. Link one and retry.") return tenant = db.get(models.Tenant, run.tenant_id) try: secret = decrypt_secret(tenant, ticket.credential_ref.secret_encrypted) except VaultError as exc: _fail(f"Credential could not be decrypted: {exc}") return username = ticket.credential_ref.username ip_address = ticket.asset.ip_address if ticket.asset else None host = ticket.credential_ref.host # The live executor decides per host whether to elevate with sudo (non-root # account) or run the command directly (root account). We pass the raw # command and store back whatever it actually ran. sudo_pw is only needed # here to scrub it from stored text. sudo_pw = sudo_password(secret) execution_log: list[dict] = [] failed = False for step in steps: real_command = resolve_placeholders(step.command, username=username, ip_address=ip_address, password=secret) result = executor.run( host=host, port=ticket.credential_ref.port, username=username, secret=secret, command=real_command, ) # The executor returns the command it actually ran (sudo-wrapped or not). # Defense in depth: scrub the secret AND the sudo password out of both # the stored command and the output before persisting/displaying. shown_command = result.command safe_output = result.output for sensitive in (secret, sudo_pw): if sensitive: shown_command = shown_command.replace(sensitive, MASKED_SECRET) safe_output = safe_output.replace(sensitive, MASKED_SECRET) execution_log.append( { "node_id": step.node_id, "label": step.label, "command": shown_command, "output": safe_output, "exit_status": result.exit_status, "duration_ms": result.duration_ms, } ) if result.exit_status != 0: failed = True break run.execution_log = execution_log ran = len(execution_log) total = len(steps) if terminal: run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.FAILED if failed else models.RemediationRunStatus.SUCCEEDED where = f" on client {host}" if use_live else " (simulated)" verb = "failed" if failed else "completed successfully" run.outcome_summary = ( f"Playbook '{run.playbook_name_snapshot}' {verb}{where} after {ran} of {total} step(s)." ) mode_label = f"LIVE execution on client {host}" if use_live else "simulated execution" else: # Dry run: leave the run PENDING_APPROVAL for the operator to review. run.outcome_summary = ( f"Simulation complete - {ran} of {total} step(s). Review the simulated output below, then " f"Execute Live to run it on the client for real over SSH." ) mode_label = "dry run (simulation)" # Fold the full per-step output into the permanent Actions Taken log too, # so the operator can view the results of every run in the ticket history # (the AI panel only ever shows the latest run's execution log). _post_action( db, tenant_id=run.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user_id, body=( f"{run.outcome_summary}\nMode: {mode_label}\nApplied playbook: {run.playbook_name_snapshot}\n\n" f"Results:\n{_format_results(execution_log)}" ), ) @router.get("/runs", response_model=list[schemas.RemediationRunOut]) def list_runs( ticket_id: uuid.UUID, db: Session = Depends(get_db), user: Optional[models.User] = Depends(get_session_user), ): if not user: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED) _get_tenant_ticket(db, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) return ( db.query(models.RemediationRun) .filter(models.RemediationRun.ticket_id == ticket_id, models.RemediationRun.tenant_id == user.tenant_id) .order_by(models.RemediationRun.created_at.desc()) .all() ) @router.post("/investigate", response_model=schemas.RemediationRunOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) def investigate_ticket( ticket_id: uuid.UUID, db: Session = Depends(get_db), user: Optional[models.User] = Depends(get_session_user), client=Depends(get_anthropic_client), ): if not user: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED) tenant = db.get(models.Tenant, user.tenant_id) if not tenant.ai_enabled: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="The AI Remediation Module is disabled for this tenant") ticket = _get_tenant_ticket(db, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) enabled_playbooks = ( db.query(models.Playbook) .filter(models.Playbook.tenant_id == user.tenant_id, models.Playbook.enabled.is_(True)) .all() ) if not enabled_playbooks: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="No enabled playbooks are configured for this tenant") ticket_context = { "title": ticket.title, "description": ticket.description, "priority": ticket.priority.value, "ticket_type": ticket.ticket_type.value, } asset_context = None if ticket.asset: asset_context = { "os": ticket.asset.os, "asset_type": ticket.asset.asset_type_name, "status": ticket.asset.status.value, } # Operator-authored client/operational context, when present, is the # single most important signal for whether a given fix is safe to run # on this box - surface it explicitly to the investigator. if ticket.asset.client_context: asset_context["client_context"] = ticket.asset.client_context playbook_payload = [ { "id": pb.id, "name": pb.name, "allowed_target_os": pb.allowed_target_os, "required_approval_level": pb.required_approval_level.value, "freeform": graph_uses_freeform_command(pb.graph_json), } for pb in enabled_playbooks ] try: result = investigate( client=client, ticket_context=ticket_context, asset_context=asset_context, playbooks=playbook_payload ) except InvestigatorError as exc: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_502_BAD_GATEWAY, detail=str(exc)) run = models.RemediationRun( tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, ai_summary=result.rationale, created_by_id=user.id, ) if result.selected_playbook_id is None: run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.FAILED run.outcome_summary = "AI investigation found no suitable playbook." db.add(run) db.flush() _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=f"AI investigation found no suitable playbook. Rationale: {result.rationale}", ) log_audit(db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_investigate", detail={"selected": None}) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run playbook = next(pb for pb in enabled_playbooks if pb.id == result.selected_playbook_id) run.playbook_id = playbook.id run.playbook_name_snapshot = playbook.name run.guardrails_snapshot = { "allowed_target_os": playbook.allowed_target_os, "required_approval_level": playbook.required_approval_level.value, "forbidden_commands": playbook.forbidden_commands, "acknowledged_dangerous_commands": playbook.acknowledged_dangerous_commands, } run.graph_snapshot = playbook.graph_json db.add(run) db.flush() # A command-runner playbook: the AI proposes the actual command, which is # substituted into {{command}} and then subjected to the full guardrail # check (so the non-overridable baseline still blocks a dangerous command). is_freeform = graph_uses_freeform_command(playbook.graph_json) if is_freeform: run.suggested_command = result.suggested_command guardrail_result = run_guardrails( graph_json=playbook.graph_json, allowed_target_os=playbook.allowed_target_os, forbidden_commands=playbook.forbidden_commands, asset_os=ticket.asset.os if ticket.asset else None, freeform_command=result.suggested_command if is_freeform else None, acknowledged_dangerous_commands=playbook.acknowledged_dangerous_commands, **_ticket_credential_context(ticket), ) if not guardrail_result.ok: run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.BLOCKED run.outcome_summary = guardrail_result.reason _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=( f"AI selected playbook '{playbook.name}' but execution was blocked by guardrails: " f"{guardrail_result.reason}" ), ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_investigate", detail={"selected": playbook.name, "blocked": True} ) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run steps = guardrail_result.steps or [] display_steps = _display_steps(steps, ticket) run.proposed_plan = [asdict(s) for s in display_steps] _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=( f"AI investigation selected playbook '{playbook.name}'. Rationale: {result.rationale}\n" f"Proposed plan:\n{_format_plan(display_steps)}" ), ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_investigate", detail={"selected": playbook.name, "blocked": False} ) # A run that includes an acknowledged review-eligible command (e.g. a # reboot) ALWAYS goes to a human, even on an Auto-Approve playbook: the # acknowledgement unblocks it, it never makes it run unattended. if guardrail_result.requires_review: run.outcome_summary = guardrail_result.review_reason _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=( f"Playbook '{playbook.name}' requires human review before running: " f"{guardrail_result.review_reason} It is awaiting an explicit Approve & Execute." ), ) # LIVE execution on the client NEVER happens here: it always requires an # explicit human "Execute Live" click AND a prior simulation of the same # run. So every run lands in PENDING_APPROVAL. An Auto-Approve playbook # (no acknowledged/review-required command, not a free-form runner) still # gets a hands-off head start: its plan is auto-run through the SIMULATED # executor now, so the operator opens the ticket to a completed rehearsal # and can go straight to Execute Live. Written as an allow-list so a future # edit can only make the auto-simulation MORE restrictive. run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL may_auto_simulate = ( playbook.required_approval_level == models.ApprovalLevel.AUTO_APPROVE and not guardrail_result.requires_review and not is_freeform ) if may_auto_simulate: _run_plan(db, run=run, ticket=ticket, steps=steps, user_id=user.id, live=False, terminal=False) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run @router.post("/runs/{run_id}/approve", response_model=schemas.RemediationRunOut) def approve_run( ticket_id: uuid.UUID, run_id: uuid.UUID, payload: schemas.RemediationApproveRequest = schemas.RemediationApproveRequest(), db: Session = Depends(get_db), user: Optional[models.User] = Depends(get_session_user), ): if not user: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED) ticket = _get_tenant_ticket(db, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) run = _get_tenant_run(db, run_id, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) if run.status != models.RemediationRunStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="This run is not awaiting approval") # Simulate-before-live: live execution on the client is only allowed once # this exact run has been rehearsed with a simulation (Dry-run). A pending # run only ever gets an execution_log from a dry run (a live run is # terminal), so its presence is the proof a simulation was reviewed first. if not run.execution_log: raise HTTPException( status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Run a simulation (Dry-run) first, review the result, then Execute Live on the client.", ) snapshot = run.guardrails_snapshot or {} # For a command-runner run, the human may have edited the AI's suggested # command in the approval card. Whatever they approve (their edit, or the # AI's suggestion if unchanged) is re-run through the FULL guardrail engine # here - so the non-overridable baseline blocks a dangerous edited command # too, and the run remembers exactly what was approved. is_freeform = graph_uses_freeform_command(run.graph_snapshot or {}) final_command = None if is_freeform: final_command = (payload.command if payload.command is not None else run.suggested_command) or "" run.suggested_command = final_command guardrail_result = run_guardrails( graph_json=run.graph_snapshot or {}, allowed_target_os=snapshot.get("allowed_target_os", []), forbidden_commands=snapshot.get("forbidden_commands", []), asset_os=ticket.asset.os if ticket.asset else None, freeform_command=final_command if is_freeform else None, acknowledged_dangerous_commands=snapshot.get("acknowledged_dangerous_commands", []), **_ticket_credential_context(ticket), ) if not guardrail_result.ok: run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.BLOCKED run.outcome_summary = guardrail_result.reason _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=f"Approval blocked by guardrails: {run.outcome_summary}", ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_execute_live", detail={"run_id": str(run.id), "playbook": run.playbook_name_snapshot, "blocked": True}, ) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run # Record the exact approved plan (with the final command resolved for # display/masking) so the ticket history reflects what was actually run. if is_freeform: run.proposed_plan = [asdict(s) for s in _display_steps(guardrail_result.steps or [], ticket)] run.approved_by_id = user.id run.approved_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.EXECUTING _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=f"Live execution approved by {user.full_name} after review of the simulation - running on the client (live SSH).", ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_execute_live", detail={ "run_id": str(run.id), "ticket_id": str(ticket.id), "playbook": run.playbook_name_snapshot, "steps": len(guardrail_result.steps or []), "live": True, "confirmed": True, }, ) # The operator's explicit go-ahead, gated above on a prior simulation: run # for real on the client over SSH. _run_plan(db, run=run, ticket=ticket, steps=guardrail_result.steps or [], user_id=user.id, live=True, terminal=True) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run @router.post("/runs/{run_id}/dry-run", response_model=schemas.RemediationRunOut) def dry_run( ticket_id: uuid.UUID, run_id: uuid.UUID, payload: schemas.RemediationApproveRequest = schemas.RemediationApproveRequest(), db: Session = Depends(get_db), user: Optional[models.User] = Depends(get_session_user), ): """Rehearse a pending run WITHOUT touching the client: every step runs through the SIMULATED executor, the results are stored on the run, and it stays PENDING_APPROVAL so the operator can review the simulated output and then Approve & Execute for real. A guardrail failure (e.g. an edited free-form command that trips the baseline) is reported without changing the run's state, so the operator can adjust and re-run.""" if not user: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED) ticket = _get_tenant_ticket(db, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) run = _get_tenant_run(db, run_id, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) if run.status != models.RemediationRunStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="This run is not awaiting approval") snapshot = run.guardrails_snapshot or {} is_freeform = graph_uses_freeform_command(run.graph_snapshot or {}) final_command = None if is_freeform: final_command = (payload.command if payload.command is not None else run.suggested_command) or "" run.suggested_command = final_command guardrail_result = run_guardrails( graph_json=run.graph_snapshot or {}, allowed_target_os=snapshot.get("allowed_target_os", []), forbidden_commands=snapshot.get("forbidden_commands", []), asset_os=ticket.asset.os if ticket.asset else None, freeform_command=final_command if is_freeform else None, acknowledged_dangerous_commands=snapshot.get("acknowledged_dangerous_commands", []), **_ticket_credential_context(ticket), ) if not guardrail_result.ok: # Non-destructive: don't terminate the run, just report why it can't run # so the operator can edit the command / fix the ticket and dry-run again. raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=guardrail_result.reason) if is_freeform: run.proposed_plan = [asdict(s) for s in _display_steps(guardrail_result.steps or [], ticket)] _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=f"Dry run (simulation) performed by {user.full_name}.", ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_dry_run", detail={"run_id": str(run.id), "ticket_id": str(ticket.id), "playbook": run.playbook_name_snapshot, "simulated": True}, ) _run_plan(db, run=run, ticket=ticket, steps=guardrail_result.steps or [], user_id=user.id, live=False, terminal=False) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run @router.post("/runs/{run_id}/reject", response_model=schemas.RemediationRunOut) def reject_run( ticket_id: uuid.UUID, run_id: uuid.UUID, db: Session = Depends(get_db), user: Optional[models.User] = Depends(get_session_user), ): if not user: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED) ticket = _get_tenant_ticket(db, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) run = _get_tenant_run(db, run_id, ticket_id, user.tenant_id) if run.status != models.RemediationRunStatus.PENDING_APPROVAL: raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="This run is not awaiting approval") run.status = models.RemediationRunStatus.REJECTED _post_action( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, ticket_id=ticket.id, user_id=user.id, body=f"Remediation run rejected by {user.full_name}.", ) log_audit( db, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, user_id=user.id, action="remediation_reject", detail={"run_id": str(run.id), "ticket_id": str(ticket.id), "playbook": run.playbook_name_snapshot}, ) db.commit() db.refresh(run) return run |